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Repeated evidence in Britain demonstrates the positive electoral payoffs from
constituency campaigning. However, the impact of such campaigning varies de-
pending upon the electoral context and the effectiveness of campaign manage-
ment. Debate also exists in respect of the relative impact of traditional versus
more modern campaign techniques, as well as between campaign techniques
that incur cost and those that are carried out voluntarily. Such debates are of
interest not only to academics and political parties, but also to regulators when
considering whether to restrict campaign spending in the interests of electoral
parity. This article uses candidate spending data and responses to an extensive
survey of election agents at the British General Election of 2010 to assess the
impact of both campaign expenditure and free, voluntary labour on electoral per-
formance. It suggests that both have some independent impact, but that impact
varies by party. The implications of these results are highly significant in both aca-
demic and regulatory terms—campaign expenditure can affect electoral out-
comes but these effects are offset to some extent by voluntary efforts.
There is now a large body or research which demonstrates over a series of elec-
tions that campaigning at district (constituency) level in Britain can produce
electoral payoffs (Whiteley and Seyd, 1994; Pattie et al., 1995; Denver and
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Hands, 1997; Denver et al., 2003; Clarke et al., 2004, 2009; Fieldhouse and Cutts,
2008; Fisher et al., 2011). The level of payoffs varies. For example, Fisher et al.
(2011) show that there are four key variables exogenous to a constituency
which impact upon the effectiveness of campaigning: the closeness of the election
at national level, the likelihood of a significant change in parties’ standing, the
number of target seats and the extent to which central parties have clear objectives
in respect of their campaign management. Equally, Pattie et al. (1995) have shown
that the effectiveness of candidate campaign spending varies depending upon
whether a candidate is an incumbent or a challenger, reflecting the work of
Gary Jacobson (1980) in the USA, and Pattie and Johnston (2009) have shown
that the payoffs are less for government parties than for their opponents.
Overall, however, different research teams, using different data have arrived at
broadly the same conclusion—campaigning at the district level can influence
electoral outcomes.
The two principal approaches to the measurement of campaign intensity as a
means to assess electoral effects use different data sources, which are brought to-
gether for this article. The first uses candidate spending data as a surrogate for
campaign intensity.2 The second employs a survey of election agents3 designed
to capture the many different aspects of campaigns: preparation, organisation,
manpower, use of computers, polling day activity, use of telephones, use of
direct mail, canvassing, use of leaflets and e-campaigning (Fisher et al., 2011:
827). Critically, this includes both campaign techniques that incur financial
cost, but also those that are provided free by volunteers. Both approaches have
advantages and disadvantages. The agent survey is a much more direct
measure of campaign intensity than campaign spending, and captures a very
wide range of activities. However, it is potentially limited by response rates.
That said, the 2010 survey solicited a very respectable response rate of 54%.
And the responses to the survey were in fact strongly representative, both in
terms of the electoral status of the seats and when comparing them with the per-
centage of maximum spend by candidates during the regulated ‘Long’ and ‘Short’
campaigns—see Appendix Tables A1 and A2. The analysis of candidate spending
is not constrained by response rates. Declaration of spending is required by law
and the returns are published by the Electoral Commission. Thus, near complete
2Candidate spending in Britain is limited by law and that limit varies by the electorate and geography
of the constituency. Thus, the appropriate measurement of candidate spending is not the total
expenditure, but the percentage of the maximum permitted.
3All candidates are legally obliged to retain an election agent. The agent is responsible for the
organisation and conduct of the campaign. This survey is sent to election agents of all candidates
in Great Britain from the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, Plaid
Cymru and the Scottish National Party standing for election to the Westminster Parliament.
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spending data are available for almost all candidates across a long run of elections.
However, campaign spending focuses on the material aspects of the campaign
(most money is spent on printed material such as leaflets), and cannot properly
capture volunteer effort. Notwithstanding, previous studies (Denver and Hands,
1997; Johnston and Pattie, 2006) have shown a fairly strong relationship between
the level of candidate spending and the wider level of campaign intensity (as cap-
tured through the survey). And Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008) show that in 2005,
both spending and the agent survey intensity index tapped the same underlying
latent construct or campaign effort. In 2010, spending again correlated with
overall campaign intensity, but not perhaps as strongly as one might expect.
For example, correlating the candidate expenditure over the period from the dis-
solution of Parliament to polling day (the ‘Short campaign’) with overall cam-
paign intensity produces correlation coefficients (r) of 0.618, 0.732 and 0.716
for the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats, respectively. Candidate
spending captures a significant proportion of campaign intensity, but clearly
not all of it.
1. Candidate spending
The fact that candidate spending fails to capture a significant proportion of cam-
paign efforts matters not only in academic terms, but also in regulatory ones.
Candidate expenditure has been limited by law in Britain since 1883—a move
designed both to limit any potential electoral benefit arising from a larger finan-
cial endowment and also to limit the cost of elections themselves (Clift and
Fisher, 2004). However, despite this longstanding regulation, significant concerns
have been raised in recent years about the electoral impact of spending outside
the regulatory period. Johnston and Pattie (2007) have shown, for example,
that Conservative spending at the district level in advance of the 2005 election
did indeed yield electoral payoffs, while more recent work by Cutts et al.
(2012) shows that this was also the case in 2010. As a result of such concerns,
the regulated period was extended in the 2010 election. In addition to the
period from dissolution to polling day (a period of between 3 and 6 weeks at
recent elections)—the ‘Short campaign’—legislation introduced in 2009 intro-
duced a second regulated period of limited candidate spending—from
1 January 2010 to the dissolution (a period of just over three months): the
‘Long campaign’. Despite this introduction, concerns have remained about the
ability of the currently financially dominant Conservatives to gain an electoral
advantage on account of their greater spending power. Table 1 illustrates the
Conservatives’ advantage. On average, Conservative candidates were able to
spend 66.7% of the legal maximum in the Short campaign period, compared
with 51 and 37.4% for Labour and the Liberal Democrats respectively.
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Combining the spending in both regulated periods (the Long and the Short cam-
paign) again shows a fairly substantial Conservative advantage.
However, despite the Conservative financial advantage overall, the electoral
advantages were less clear cut. At both national and district levels, the extra
spending power was not matched by electoral gains to the same degree (Fisher,
2010; Johnston et al., Forthcoming). What accounts for this apparent anomaly?
First, of course, it could be that the Conservatives spent their money unwisely
and that other parties targeted resources more effectively. One way to test this
is to assess the level of spending depending upon the electoral status of a seat. Al-
though the unit of analysis is campaigning at the district level, all parties seek to
coordinate their district level campaigns from the centre. This level of centralisa-
tion has been increasing over time (Fisher and Denver, 2008) and has yielded
electoral payoffs (Fisher et al., 2006). Thus, central parties designate whether or
not seats are targets. This exercise is more than cosmetic. Target seats receive
more in the way of assistance from the central party, through the provision, for
example, of staff and also through telephone and direct mail campaigning run
from the centre.
As a result of such coordination, broadly speaking, we would expect a party’s
national and regional organisations to ensure that their local parties—which are
responsible for raising almost all of the money spent on the constituency
campaigns—to be more active raising funds in their target seats (seats which it
was seeking to gain, or its own seats which the party regarded as being vulnerable)
and least in the seats where it had no chance of winning. In seats which a party
holds, but where there is little chance of defeat, we would expect levels of spend-
ing to be somewhere in between.4 Table 2 examines whether this is the case.5 As
we can see, the patterns of candidate spending were much as predicted with the
Conservatives on average outspending their two opponents in all seat categories
Table 1. Mean maximum of permitted candidate expenditure in 2010 (n ¼ 621)
% Conservative Labour Lib Dems
Short campaign 66.7 51.0 37.4
Short + Long campaign 38.2 25.6 19.6
4In 2010, the context for designating target seats was a little uncertain on account of extensive
boundary reviews in England and Wales following the 2005 election. Thus, both parties and indeed
academics made use of notional results in England and Wales for 2005.
5Seat categories in terms of electoral status are determined by the central parties. Thus, in the 2010
election, all existing Liberal Democrat seats were regarded as targets. As a result, there are no seats
in the Held not Target category.
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both in the Short campaign and in the two campaigns combined. The only par-
ticular surprise is that Conservative spending was relatively high in both its safe
seats (labelled Held not Target) and in seats where the party had very little chance
of electoral success (labelled not Held not Target). This relative lack of
differentiation is a function in part of this three-category table. The categories
do not, for example, discriminate between degrees of marginality within the cat-
egories, and Johnston et al. (Forthcoming) show that there is a clear relationship
between marginality and levels of spending. However, the central parties’ target
lists do not tally entirely with marginality (though there is a link). Thus, while
the table may understate the differentiation between categories a little, the
central point remains that the differentiation between targets and non-targets
for the Conservatives was weaker than might have been expected.
A second possibility is that, overall, parties’ campaigns were differentially
effective on account of campaign management. These were the conclusions of
Fisher et al. (2011), who show that despite the exogenous contextual circum-
stances being unfavourable to Labour, the party was successful in boosting its
vote through campaigning by having clear objectives about the desired
outcome of the election. Labour knew it was likely to lose and so its strategy
was to minimise Conservative gains in order to deny the party a parliamentary
majority. This entailed effectively sacrificing some seats won by only small
margins in 2005, which were likely to be won by the Conservatives in 2010, in
order to focus resources to those seats that, if held, would deny the Conservatives
a majority. By way of contrast, the Conservatives focused too much attention on
seats that the party would win anyway.
A third possibility is that candidate expenditure does not capture all the key
aspects of campaigning sufficiently well. A reliance on this measure alone as an
indicator of campaign intensity therefore has the potential to generate a mislead-
ing picture. To be sure, many aspects of campaigning do require expenditure
(notably on the printing of leaflets, posters and other media which is what the
bulk of the reported expenditure goes on: Johnston et al., 2011), and these will
be captured by candidate spending. But given that many aspects of campaigning
Table 2. Candidate spending by electoral status (n ¼ 621)
Short (Short1 Long) Held not Target Target Not Held not Target
Conservative 78.4 (39.1) 88.7 (64.2) 44.1 (21.4)
Labour 65.7 (27.9) 78.9 (51.1) 23.7 (9.7)
Liberal Democrat n/a 88.7 (63.2) 27.7 (11.4)
Note: Figures represent the percentage spent on the maximum permitted expenditure.
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rely on labour and cannot legally be undertaken by paid staff, but can be carried
out by unpaid volunteers, there is the possibility that parties can counteract the
effects of differential wealth through the efforts of unpaid volunteers engaged in a
whole range of activities including canvassing, and polling day activities such as
‘knocking-up’ to ensure that a party’s identified supporters remember to vote.
Again, the effectiveness of these activities will depend both on their aggregate
levels, and how efficiently the efforts of volunteers are distributed. This then, is
the focus of this article. To what extent does ‘free campaigning’, independent of
that which incurs cost, make a separate contribution to parties’ electoral perform-
ance at the district level?
2. Free campaigning
The survey of election agents provides some useful data with which to address this
issue, featuring three questions which broadly capture the ‘free’ aspects of election
campaigns. They cover the proportion of the electorate canvassed on the doorstep
during a campaign; the proportion of the constituency covered by volunteers
staffing polling stations to take details of who had voted and the number of
polling day workers. Table 3 illustrates the relative strength of each party in
respect of these free activities. Across every indicator, the Conservatives had a
significant advantage—double that of their competitors in some instances.
However, as with any resource, the aggregate total only tells us so much. What
is more important is where that resource is utilised and how effectively.
To get a better indication of the distribution of ‘free’ campaign effort, it is
more useful to produce a scale of the above items. This is done through principal
components analysis.6 All three variables load on a single factor as one might
expect (for the full solution, see Appendix Table A3). These scores were then
standardised around a mean of 100 to permit ease of interpretation.
Table 3. Mean free campaign indicators by party
Conservative Labour Lib Dems
% electorate canvassed 26 16 10
% of constituency covered by number takers 33 16 17
No. of polling day workers 88 42 46
N 287 388 353
6Where there were missing data on individual variables that formed part of these scales, multiple
imputation was used, which took account of the individual party and the target status of the seat.
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Table 4 illustrates the distribution of free resources by the electoral status of the
seat. Here, we might expect a more efficient distribution of effort than is the case
with candidate spending as the amount of volunteer activity is not capped.
However, often frustratingly for parties, human resources may actually be less
mobile than financial ones (Fisher and Denver, 2008). And so the picture is
mixed. On the one hand, the level of free campaigning in seats where a party is
unlikely to make an electoral breakthrough (Not Held not Target) is evidently
much lower than in other seats for all parties. On the other hand, however, the
differentiation in intensity between target seats and those that are ‘safe’ (Held
not Target) is tiny. Political circumstances may explain this a little in the case
of the Labour Party. The party was unpopular and defending gains won after
three election victories. In that sense, safe seats may not have been perceived as
such by those offering the free effort.
In the case of the Conservative Party, however, the lack of differentiation is
more difficult to explain, particularly given its relative popularity prior to the
election. Yet it may reflect a longer term problem in the party, whereby electoral
efforts are often misdirected at safer seats—especially where the central party is
unable to deploy resources more effectively. Overall, then, the Conservatives
enjoyed the highest level of free campaigning, but that advantage was tempered
through strong targeting by the Liberal Democrats and, to an extent, seemingly
excessive effort by the Conservatives in their safe seats. Of course, strong
efforts in safe seats would be unlikely to damage the Conservative cause, but
would represent a missed opportunity to focus efforts more effectively given
the limited resources available, overall.
3. The electoral impact
To assess the relative electoral impact of candidate spending and free district level
campaigning, we include both candidate spending data and the free campaigning
index from the election agent survey in a single analysis. We create a model which
regresses the impact of these two variables on the share of the vote in 2010, while
Table 4. Mean free campaigning effort by electoral status
All Held not Target Target Not Held not Target
Conservative (n ¼ 287) 118 132 135 96
Labour (n ¼ 388) 95 108 109 80
Liberal Democrat (n ¼ 353) 92 n/a 128 86
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controlling for the share of that party’s vote in 20057 and whether the party was
fielding an incumbent candidate. Controlling for previous vote share through the
use of a lagged endogenous variable is a widely used technique which introduces a
dynamic specification into the model. The approach has a number of advantages.
First, it allows us to capture factors affecting the change in electoral performance
which is a much more meaningful gauge of effectiveness than simple 2010 vote
share. Secondly, it captures the effect of a variety of other factors which are
correlated with the underlying level of performance of each party (such as the
demographic profile of the electorate). Thirdly, it captures the effects of previous
campaigns at earlier elections. In sum, though we are not concerned with the
value of the lagged endogenous variable itself, its use generates a more conserva-
tive picture of any campaign effects. We also control for personal incumbency as
there is ample evidence to suggest that this had an independent impact in 2010
(Johnston et al., Forthcoming). The inclusion of vote share at the previous
election not surprisingly has a significant and very substantial effect on model
fit because the geography of voting for a party tends to be consistent across a
series of elections, varying only in its relative topography. But it also serves to
illustrate that where effects are found, they are likely to be robust. We operation-
alise our model using OLS.
The first analysis (Table 5) uses candidate spending during the Short campaign
period, while the second (Table 6) uses the aggregate expenditure of candidates
over the whole regulated period (Long plus Short campaigns). In both, we are
seeking, first, to assess if candidate spending and free district campaigning each
have independent effects. If they do, it suggests that factors not captured by
candidate spending have electoral effects. If that is the case, it would suggest
that disparities in spending can be offset to a degree by the level of free campaign-
ing. And, if both candidate spending and free campaigning have independent
effects, we can then compare their relative effects using the standardised beta
coefficients.
The results vary across the three parties. In the case of the Conservatives, the
findings are clear. Candidate spending over both regulated periods yielded elect-
oral payoffs, while free campaigning had no impact in either model. This may be
surprising in one sense—after all, the Conservatives had the highest levels of free
campaigning overall and the highest levels in target seats. However, the relative
lack of impact may be explained first by relatively poor targeting. Thus, while
7This analysis, like all of the others reported here, excludes the 18 Northern Ireland constituencies plus
that being defended by the Speaker (where the parties traditionally do not field candidates) and Thirsk
and Malton, where the election was held later (under different spending limits) because of the death of
a candidate during the Short campaign period. Boundary revisions took place in England and Wales
between 2005 and 2010 and so these are notional 2005 vote shares in England and Wales, but not in
Scotland, where the boundaries were unchanged.
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Table 5. The electoral impact of candidate spending and free district campaigning (Short campaign spend)
Conservative (n5 281) Labour (n 5 384) Lib Dem (n 5 347)
b Std Error Beta Sig b Std Error Beta Sig b Std Error Beta Sig
Constant 2.741 0.646 ** 28.175 1.004 ** 2.889 0.848 **
Vote 2005 0.966 0.022 0.925 ** 0.872 0.023 0.840 ** 0.662 0.036 0.658 **
Incumbent 0.932 0.558 0.029 n.s. 2.270 0.689 0.066 ** 3.553 0.994 0.097 **
Free campaigning 0.001 0.005 0.002 n.s. 0.046 0.011 0.079 ** 0.036 0.010 0.095 **
Candidate spending 0.028 0.009 0.054 ** 0.025 0.012 0.047 * 0.060 0.010 0.184 **
Adj. R2 0.955 0.907 0.864
n.s. not statistically significant.
Note: **p , 0.01, *p , 0.05.
Table 6. The electoral impact of candidate spending and free district campaigning (Short + Long campaign spend)
Conservative (n 5 281) Labour (n 5 384) Lib Dem (n5 347)
b Std Error Beta Sig b Std Error Beta Sig b Std Error Beta Sig
Constant 3.317 0.636 ** 28.456 1.007 ** 3.681 0.884 **
Vote 2005 0.969 0.021 0.928 ** 0.887 0.022 0.854 ** 0.665 0.035 0.660 **
Incumbent 1.408 0.581 0.044 * 2.441 0.689 0.071 ** 3.061 0.985 0.083 **
Free campaigning 20.002 0.006 20.005 n.s. 0.051 0.011 0.088 ** 0.033 0.010 0.087 **
Candidate spending 0.037 0.009 0.062 ** 0.015 0.016 0.018 n.s. 0.090 0.014 0.196 **
Adj. R2 0.956 0.906 0.865
n.s., not statistically significant.
Note: **p , 0.01, *p , 0.05.
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the Conservatives had strong levels of free campaigning in target seats, the same
was also true in their safe seats. As a result, the overall effectiveness of their free
campaigning will have been suppressed as any gains that would have been made
in safe seats (particularly with that party being relatively popular) would be mar-
ginal. Secondly, of course, the data suggest that the impact of candidate spending
was so great that any effects of free campaigning were significantly diminished.
In the case of Labour, the position is effectively reversed. Comparing free cam-
paigning with candidate spending during the ‘Short campaign’ (Table 5), we find
that both had a statistically significant impact on share of the vote, though spend-
ing only just reaches statistical significance. This, along with the standardised beta
coefficients, suggests that free campaigning had a stronger effect. This is amplified
when we look at spending over the entire regulated period (Table 6). Here, can-
didate spending had no statistically significant impact, while free campaigning
continued to do so. Labour, of course, spent considerably less than the Conserva-
tives (see Table 1), but what is apparent is that free campaigning appears to have
compensated to some extent. The impact is confirmed when we compare the
models first by including spending alone, and then by adding free campaigning.
In both cases, F-tests confirm that the addition of free campaigning produces a
statistically significant improvement in model fit.
Analysis of the Liberal Democrats also produces some interesting results.
Again, both candidate spending and free campaigning had statistically significant
effects (and in this case for both the Short campaign and the full regulated
period). And, as with Labour, F-tests confirm the statistically significant improve-
ment in the models generated by the inclusion of free campaigning. However, the
order of the effects is perhaps unexpected. The Liberal Democrats have tradition-
ally had significantly less money to spend and have relied on well-targeted efforts
by grass roots activists (Cutts, 2006; Cutts and Shryane, 2006). We might expect,
therefore, that the effects of free campaigning would be stronger than candidate
spending. In fact, the reverse is true. The beta coefficients indicate that candidate
spending had the stronger effect on Liberal Democrat vote share. Given that the
Liberal Democrats spent substantially less than the Conservatives and somewhat
less than Labour (see Table 1), the puzzle is why this occurred. The likely answer is
effective targeting. As Table 2 shows, Liberal Democrat candidate spending in
their target seats was broadly comparable with that of Conservative candidates
in that party’s targets. The Liberal Democrats had less money overall, but candi-
date spend was distributed very effectively. Of course, free campaigning by the
Liberal Democrats was also effective. But once again, it was well targeted. As
Table 4 shows, free campaigning by the Liberal Democrats in target seats was
broadly comparable with that of the Conservatives too.
Of course, it is very likely to be the case that high levels of free activity in
a constituency are associated with high levels of spending (and vice versa),
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suggesting possible problems with collinearity. Certainly, the index of free cam-
paigning correlates positively with the levels of spending for all three parties,
though not perhaps as strongly as we might expect.8 Thus, to confirm the
robust nature of our findings, we regressed levels of free activity on candidate
spending during the Short campaign and during the whole regulated period.
From this we took standardised residuals for each as measures of free campaign-
ing independent of spending. We then re-ran the regression models using these
standardised residuals instead of the normal indicator of free campaigning.
The results are shown in the Appendix (Tables A4 and A5) and confirm the
broad findings in Tables 5 and 6.
The models reported in Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that campaign effort
(indexed by both candidate spending and our ‘free campaign’ measure) does
boost vote share. But can it do so sufficiently to change the pattern of party rep-
resentation in Parliament (the parties’ ultimate aim)? We can gain some idea by
using the models to simulate election outcomes under different party campaign-
ing assumptions. For both sets of models, we look at six different scenarios. In the
first three scenarios, we assume that in every constituency all three parties’ ‘free
campaign’ efforts are at the same level as each party’s least active constituency
campaign in 2010, and we further assume that two of the three party
candidates spend nothing on any of their constituency campaigns while the
remaining party candidates spends 100% of their legal allowance in every seat.
In the final three scenarios, we assume that the party candidates spend nothing
on their campaigns anywhere, and that two of the three parties run ‘free
campaigns’ in all seats at the level of their least active free campaign in 2010,
while the remaining party’s free campaign is at the level of its most active 2010
constituency campaign.
For each scenario, we estimate the parties’ vote shares in every constituency,
and hence the likely outcome in seats (Table 7). While somewhat extreme, in
that each scenario assumes one party runs a full-tilt campaign everywhere,
while its rivals make minimal efforts, this does give some impression of the
range of likely effects. And they can be substantial. For instance, had Conservative
candidates spent up to the limit everywhere in the Short campaign while facing
minimal campaigns from their rivals, the models predict they would have won
337 seats in 2010 to Labour’s 244 and the Liberal Democrats’ 39 (enough for a
8The correlations between free campaigning and the regulated spending periods (Short and Short Plus
Long) are: 0.470 and 0.464 for the Conservatives; 0.585 and 0.526 for Labour; and 0.555 and 0.585 for
the Liberal Democrats, so little more than, at most, one-third of the variation in free campaigning can
be associated with that in spending. Scatter plots show that in general for all three-parties
constituencies with low spending levels also have low values on each of the free campaigning
variables but there is much greater variation in the amounts of free campaigning mobilised in seats
where spending levels are above average.
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Parliamentary majority). But had Labour candidates been the party spending up
to the limit everywhere while its rivals remained quiescent, the party could,
despite its national unpopularity, have hoped to draw almost even with the Con-
servatives in MPs elected, gaining 286 seats to the latter’s 288. The simulations
also show that the potential effects of ‘combined’ Long and Short campaign
spending on the distribution of seats was larger than those for Short campaign
spending alone, and that the effects of going from the least active ‘free campaign’
everywhere to the most active were greater than the effects of going from spend-
ing nothing to spending up to the hilt. This latter finding is particularly striking,
as it suggests voluntary (and largely face-to-face) activity has greater campaign
potential than money alone (which mainly contributes to more impersonal
forms of campaigning, such as leafleting). Parties neglect their grassroots at
their peril, and concentrating on building strong local networks of active
members and supporters9 may yield greater electoral dividends than ensuring
well-funded constituency campaigns alone.
Overall, these analyses suggest that candidate spending as a measure of cam-
paign intensity is a very useful surrogate measure. But it does not capture a
significant aspect of campaigns—that provided free through voluntary labour.
And, most critically, for Labour and the Liberal Democrats where free campaign-
ing was substantial in 2010 it had significant electoral effects, independent of
candidate spending. These findings are not an isolated example. Using a different
measure of campaign spending, Fisher (2011) shows that free campaigning has
Table 7. Predicting the effects of local campaigning on seat distributions
Scenario Con
spend
100%
Lab
spend
100%
LD
spend
100%
Con max.
free
campaign
Lab max.
free
campaign
LD max.
free
campaign
‘Short campaign spend’ models: Seats
Conservative 337 288 293 308 237 290
Labour 244 286 259 265 342 259
Lib Dem 39 46 68 47 42 71
‘Combined campaign spend’ models: Seats
Conservative 344 292 285 298 231 293
Labour 240 282 252 273 350 261
Lib Dem 37 46 83 49 40 66
9Fisher, Fieldhouse and Cutts (Forthcoming) show that parties rely not only on members for their
voluntary labour, but also supporters (who are not members). Indeed, some 78% of Conservative,
Labour and Liberal Democrat local parties recruited supporters to assist with their campaigns at
the 2010 Election.
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had independent effects for these two parties in most elections from 1992 to 2005.
The implications here are clear. To be sure, the Conservatives enjoyed a significant
financial advantage over their rivals in terms of candidate spending and were suc-
cessful to a degree in exploiting that advantage. However, the advantages enjoyed
by the Conservatives were offset in part by the impact of free campaigning by
Labour and the Liberal Democrats.
However, the results in Tables 5 and 6 do not paint an entirely full picture
since, of course, campaigns do not occur in isolation—other parties are also
campaigning in constituencies. Thus, the optimal outcome of any one party’s
campaign is not only to enhance its share of the vote, but also to damage that
of other parties. A further analysis is therefore required, which includes constitu-
encies where we have free campaigning scores and candidate spending data for all
three parties. Inevitably, this results in a significant reduction in the number of
available cases and so it is here, where we have only 98 of the 630 constituencies
with full data on candidate spending and levels of free campaigning for the Con-
servatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats. This reduction in the number
of cases means that the analysis we conduct should inevitably be treated with
some caution. However, the results discussed and shown in the Appendix
(Tables A6 and A7) continue to support the findings that free campaigning
produces independent electoral payoffs and that candidate spending does not
tell the whole story when examining campaign effectiveness.
4. Conclusions
Measuring the intensity of constituency campaigns at British general elections in
order to assess their electoral impact has become increasingly sophisticated, with
multiple sources of data employed. The result has been that researchers can illus-
trate very clearly that campaigns can boost electoral performance, but that effect-
ive management of these campaigns is essential to maximise their impact.
Inevitably, any measure will not capture all of the effects. The survey of election
agents has difficulty capturing efforts more than a year prior to polling day (and
there is plentiful evidence that a significant amount of activity takes place before
then), while the analysis of candidate spending can only focus on spending
during regulated periods when candidates are required to file a return. Neverthe-
less, the various sources of data present a convincing case that spending and other
canvassing/campaigning activities during the period immediately preceding an
election can make a substantial impact on a party’s performance. By combining
data (as we do in this article), we are therefore in a position to make a good
assessment about the extent to which the level of spending by a candidate is
core to understanding his or her electoral performance. Of course, no one
could fight an election without money, nor with a trifling sum—it is very clear
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empirically that even the most token campaigns require some expenditure and
that broadly speaking, better funded campaigns have strong potential to deliver
electoral payoffs and indeed do so.
However, what this article shows is that level of spending does not capture all
campaign effects, and that free volunteer labour can also have a significant impact
(see also Fisher et al., Forthcoming). As we see in the cases of Labour and the
Liberal Democrats, their financial disadvantage relative to the Conservatives
was offset somewhat by both effective management of their resources though
targeting, but also by the level of free campaigning. Somewhat intriguingly,
this was not the case for the Conservatives. But this result may tell us more
about the continuing relative inability of that party to direct resources at a
local level effectively, than about the nature of Conservative free campaigning.
In essence, money matters and better financially endowed candidates will gener-
ally perform better electorally. Even so, it is apparent from this article that a party
can compensate for its relative poverty to an extent, through well-targeted and
well-managed free campaign activity.
Such conclusions may give cause for cautious optimism to those concerned
that election outcomes can be unduly influenced by financial disparity, since
better financial endowment may not be automatically beneficial in electoral
terms. But they also have regulatory implications. As we show earlier in the
article, concern about the distorting effects of candidate spending have prompted
an extension of the regulated period of spending for candidates. And indeed,
Labour has previously called for the regulated period to be analogous to that
at the national level (which is currently 365 days), if not longer. Yet, if candidate
expenditure can be offset to an extent by free volunteer labour (which presumably
would be something that a democracy would wish to encourage), there might be
a case for rejecting such calls for an extended regulatory period, or even reducing
the current one given that even in target seats, candidates did not, on average,
come anywhere near to the spending cap (see Table 2). However, an alternative
view would be that although spending can be offset by free campaigning, there
is no guarantee that this will always be the case—especially where parties have
limited manpower. Thus, it makes sense to continue to regulate as we currently
do, but perhaps treat any proposals for extension more cautiously, given the
costs of compliance for what are still voluntary organisations.
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Appendix
Multi-party models
When considering the potential negative effects of opponents’ campaigning
alongside the positive ones, a different methodological approach is required.
For our single-party analyses, we used OLS regression. However, this technique
is less suitable in analysing vote shares in multiparty elections—in such analyses,
OLS has a number of flaws. For instance, it assumes that the vote share for each
party is independent of the shares for the other parties. Yet, of course, that is not
the case. If the vote share for Labour goes up, that of other parties must go down.
OLS regression predictions are also unbounded which means that a model could
theoretically predict a negative vote share or a vote share .100%. For these
reasons, a number of scholars have used seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
to account for the properties of multiparty vote share data (Katz and King,
1999; Tomz et al., 2002; Cutts and Shryane, 2006; Cutts, 2006; Pattie and
Johnston, 2009, Fisher et al., 2011). In order to overcome the problem of
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unbounded predicted values, 2010 vote shares were converted into vote share
ratios between parties using a logistic transformation.
SUR models are, therefore, constructed to examine the impact of candidate
spending and free campaigning on party support in 2010. The first model
focuses on campaigning during the Short campaign period. The second model
uses aggregate candidate expenditure (Long plus Short campaigns). In both ana-
lyses, Labour is used as the reference alternative and the natural log of the vote
share ratio between it and the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats is
taken. For completeness, we also examine the impact of candidate spending, in-
cumbency and free campaigning (independent of spending produced through the
residuals analysis above) on the Liberal Democrat-Conservative 2010 vote ratio,
where the Conservatives are the denominator in the ratio-dependent variable.
Where a party is the denominator in the ratio (Labour in the first two cases
and the Conservatives in the last case), negative values of the vote share ratio
reflect a relatively better performance for it compared with the other party.
Table A3. Principal components analysis of free campaigning index
Component
% of electorate canvassed 0.705
% of constituency covered by number takers 0.845
No. of polling day workers 0.826
Note: After varimax rotation. 1 component extracted.
Table A1. Responses. The numbers of responses for each party in the agent survey by target
status were as follows
All Held not Target Target Not Target not Held
Conservative 287 120 56 111
Labour 388 128 75 185
Liberal Democrat 353 * 50 303
Table A2. Mean percentage of maximum spend by responses during Long and Short campaigns
% Respondents All constituencies
Conservative 37.2 38.1
Labour 22.5 25.6
Liberal Democrat 18.8 19.6
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Table A4. The electoral impact of candidate spending and free district campaigning (Short campaign spend) (residual analysis)
Conservative (n5 281) Labour (n 5 384) Lib Dem (n 5 347)
b Std error Beta Sig b Std error Beta Sig b Std error Beta Sig
Constant 2.789 0.562 ** 24.988 0.673 ** 5.522 0.620 **
Vote 2005 0.966 0.022 0.925 ** 0.872 0.023 0.840 ** 0.662 0.036 0.658 **
Incumbent 0.932 0.558 0.029 n.s. 2.270 0.689 0.066 ** 3.553 0.994 0.097 **
Free Campaigning 0.023 0.196 0.002 n.s. 1.046 0.260 0.064 ** 0.830 0.224 0.079 **
Candidate Spending 0.029 0.008 0.055 ** 0.049 0.011 0.093 ** 0.077 0.010 0.236 **
Adj. R2 0.955 0.907 0.864
Note: **p , 0.01, *p , 0.05, n.s. Not statistically significant.
Table A5. The electoral impact of candidate spending and free district campaigning (Short + Long campaign spend) (residual analysis)
Conservative (n5 281) Labour (n 5 384) Lib Dem (n5 347)
b Std Error Beta Sig b Std Error Beta Sig b Std Error Beta Sig
Constant 3.139 0.541 ** 24.451 0.684 ** 6.235 0.645 **
Vote 2005 0.969 0.021 0.928 ** 0.887 0.022 0.854 ** 0.665 0.035 0.660 **
Incumbent 1.408 0.581 0.044 * 2.441 0.689 0.071 ** 3.061 0.985 0.083 **
Free Campaigning 20.071 0.199 20.005 n.s 1.232 0.270 0.075 ** 0.741 0.220 0.071 **
Candidate Spending 0.036 0.009 0.060 ** 0.053 0.015 0.064 ** 0.113 0.014 0.247 **
Adj. R2 0.956 0.906 0.865
Note: **p , 0.01, *p , 0.05, n.s. Not statistically significant.
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Table A6 shows the impact of candidate spending and free campaigning
(independent of spending as per the residual analyses in Tables A4 and
Tables A5) during the Short campaign on the 2010 vote share ratios described
above. Both equations also include control variables to account for where each
party stood an incumbent candidate. All models have a high goodness of fit
(R2), while the Breusch–Pagan test, which checks whether residuals were uncor-
related across equations, is highly significant.10 In the first two equations, Labour
is the denominator in the ratio-dependent variable. Against both the Conserva-
tives and the Liberal Democrats, Labour did better where they spent more money
during the Short campaign period. This was offset somewhat by both the other
main parties’ spending. When compared against Labour, both Conservative
and Liberal Democrat candidate spending improved both parties’ electoral
performance. While spending mattered, Labour’s level of free campaigning did
Table A6. SUR models: the impact electoral of free campaigning and candidate spending (Short
campaign spend).
Con-Lab Lib Dem-Lab Lib Dem-Con
(n 5 98) b Sig b Sig b Sig
Constant 20.05 20.45 * 20.40 *
Party spending
Labour candidate spending 20.02 * 20.01 * 0.00
Conservative candidate spending 0.01 * 0.01 * 20.01 *
Lib Dem candidate spending 0.00 0.01 * 0.01 *
Incumbency
Labour incumbent candidate 20.49 * 20.15 0.34 *
Conservative incumbent candidate 0.57 * 0.46 * 20.12
Lib Dem incumbent candidate 20.01 0.55 * 0.56 *
Free Campaigning
Labour 20.01 20.05 20.05
Conservatives 0.09 * 0.02 20.07 *
Liberal Democrats 0.07 0.16 * 0.09 *
R2 0.85 0.87 0.64
RMSE 0.04 0.04 0.03
Note: Con-Lab/LD-Lab: Breusch–Pagan test of independence: x2(1) ¼ 48.229, Pr ¼ 0.0000. Dependent
variables: Conservative–Labour vote share ratio 2010; Liberal Democrat–Labour vote share ratio 2010.
LD/Con: Breusch–Pagan test of independence: x2(1) ¼ 30.038, Pr ¼ 0.0000. Dependent variables: Liberal
Democrat–Conservative vote share ratio 2010 (Labour–Conservative vote share ratio 2010 identical to
Con-Lab above and not reported).
*p , 0.05.
10We would expect the residuals to be positively correlated. In those constituencies where one party is
stronger than predicted by the model, at least one of the other parties must be weaker. This would
result in large residual variances in both equations and makes the use of OLS regression techniques
highly problematic. It therefore justifies our decision to use an SUR model.
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not have a significant effect on its relative vote share. By way of contrast, both the
Conservatives and particularly the Liberal Democrats did better against Labour
where they ran intensive-free campaigns. In the third equation, negative coeffi-
cients indicate an increase in the Conservative vote compared with the Liberal
Democrats because Conservative vote share is the denominator in the ratio-
dependent variable. When compared against the Liberal Democrats, both Con-
servative candidate spending and free campaigning had a significant positive
impact on the Conservative vote. Yet this was somewhat offset by the Liberal
Democrats’ campaigning. Their relative vote share also increased where the
candidate spent more and had stronger free campaigns.
In Table A7, we use candidate spending over both regulated periods (the Long
and Short campaigns). Many of the findings revealed in the previous model hold
here too. All parties benefited where candidates spent more money. The main
difference is the effect of parties’ free campaigning. Compared with the Conser-
vatives, Labour-free campaigning continued to have no significant effect on party
performance. Yet, the Conservatives did benefit, not only from their own
intensive-free campaigning, but also from that of the Liberal Democrats.
Table A7. SUR models: The impact electoral of free campaigning and candidate spending
(Short + Long campaign spend)
Con-Lab Lib Dem-Lab Lib Dem-Con
(n 5 98) b Sig b Sig b Sig
Constant 0.30 * 20.15 20.40 *
Party spending
Labour candidate spending 20.03 * 20.03 * 0.00
Conservative candidate spending 0.02 * 0.01 * 20.01 *
Lib Dem candidate spending 20.00 0.02 * 0.02 *
Incumbency
Labour incumbent candidate 20.72 * 20.37 * 0.35 *
Conservative incumbent candidate 0.65 * 0.43 * 20.22 *
Lib Dem incumbent candidate 20.03 0.39 * 0.42 *
Free campaigning
Labour 20.09 20.10 * 20.01
Conservatives 0.13 * 0.06 20.07 *
Liberal Democrats 0.13 * 0.19 * 0.06 *
R2 0.82 0.85 0.68
RMSE 0.04 0.04 0.03
Note: Con-Lab/LD-Lab: Breusch–Pagan test of independence: x2(1) ¼ 59.479, Pr ¼ 0.0000. Dependent
variables: Conservative-Labour vote share ratio 2010; Liberal Democrat-Labour vote share ratio 2010.
LD/Con: Breusch–Pagan test of independence: x2(1) ¼ 30.600, Pr ¼ 0.0000. Dependent variables: Liberal
Democrat-Conservative vote share ratio 2010 (Labour-Conservative vote share ratio 2010 identical to Con-Lab
above and not reported).
*p , 0.05.
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However, against the Liberal Democrats Labour did significantly better where
they ran active free campaigns, although this was offset in part by the impact
of Liberal Democrat free campaigning. The results suggest that this proved par-
ticularly potent against Labour but was slightly less effective against the Conser-
vatives, who themselves improved their own vote against the Liberal Democrats
in those seats where they engaged in more free campaigning.
Overall, the results in Tables A6 and Tables A7 are slightly different from those
found in the main analyses in Tables 5 and 6. However, it is worth reiterating that
while the data used in Tables 5 and 6 are representative, those in Tables A6 and
Tables A7 are less so, being selected solely on the basis of data availability.
Notwithstanding, the central message of the article remains clear—free cam-
paigning in 2010 had clear and independent electoral effects compared with
candidate spending. This helps explain why the Conservatives did not perform
better in 2010 despite of their substantial financial advantage. In other words,
the level of candidate spending does not tell the whole story when examining
campaign effectiveness.
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